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The German government introduced compulsory accident insurance for industrial firms in 1884. 
This insurance scheme was one of the main pillars of Bismarck’s famous social insurance system. The 
accident-insurance system achieved only one of its intended goals: it successfully compensated workers 
and their survivors for losses due to accidents. The accident-insurance system was less successful in 
limiting the growth of work-related accidents, although that goal had been a reason for the system’s 
creation. We trace the failure to stem the growth of accidents to faulty incentives built into the 1884 
legislation. The law created mutual insurance groups that used an experience-rating system that stressed 
group rather than firm experience, leaving firms with little hope of saving on insurance contributions by 
improving the safety of their own plants. The government regulator increasingly stressed the imposition 
of safety rules that would force all firms to adopt certain safety practices. Econometric analysis shows 
that even the flawed tools available to the insurance groups were powerful, and that more consistent use 
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The compulsory accident insurance system introduced in 1884 formed the second pillar of 
Bismarck’s system of social insurance.  (The first pillar was health insurance, introduced in 1883). 
Advocates had two goals. They wanted to shield workers and firms from the economic consequences of 
industrial accidents. They also aimed to create the right institutional mechanism for a sustained struggle 
against a rising toll of industrial accidents. By mandating payments and creating large, financially solid 
insurance carriers, the new system met the first goal admirably. The new system also contained features 
that should have encouraged firms to adopt the latest methods to make their factories safer. On its face, 
the new system did not achieve this second goal; in 1914, there were 9.7 accidents per thousand covered 
workers in all, more than double the rate when the system was first introduced. Some individual sectors 
did much worse. The construction industry had 18.1 accidents per thousand workers in 1914, with a lethal 
accident rate of about 1.5 per thousand, again much increased from the 1880s.1 
There were a few bright spots, however. In some especially dangerous sectors, such as steel 
production, the overall accident rate began to decline in the years prior to 1914. The steel industry’s 
experience also hints at a more general pattern: while the overall accident rate in many industries did not 
decline as much as hoped, this overall accident rate combined a decline in fatal accident rates coupled 
with an increase in the rate of accidents with less serious consequences.  Our findings suggest this 
experience could have been more general. 
Bismarck’s system was based on a new, special-purpose mutual enterprise called a 
Berufsgenossenschaft (hereafter BGS). The BGS was a mutual insurance carrier for firms in related 
industries. Each BGS had a great deal of autonomy, subject only to some mandated approvals and 
additional rulings from the Reichsversicherungsamt (hereafter RVA), the Imperial Insurance Office. The 
system had two elements that would seem to provide the BGS with the means to reduce accidents. First, 
each firm paid an insurance contribution that was partly experience-rated. Second, the BGS could also 




1 These figures are from the “BGS database” which consists of annual observations on all accident-insurance 




firms, and appoint inspectors to make sure the rules were followed. A BGS could also fine firms that did 
not comply with is rules. 
The fact that rules were seen as useful suggests that the incentives implicit in the insurance 
contributions worked at best imperfectly. One can justify the RVA’s stress on rules in two different ways. 
First, the RVA was in a position to study safety practices and to nudge firms to adopt methods that had 
worked elsewhere. Production managers concerned about day-to-day operations have little time for 
opened-ended inquiry, and the RVA’s efforts here amounted to reducing the cost of research for firms. 
Second, the RVA emphasis on rules can be seen in the context of Weitzman (1974)’s famous discussion 
of prices (P) and quantities (Q). In theory a BGS could achieve the desired (presumably lower) rate of 
accidents by announcing the correct P, that is, the premium depending on its number of accidents, and 
letting firms optimize in the face of that constraint. If P is indeed announced correctly, and there are no 
externalities or information problems, the BGS could achieve its ends without any rules. As we show, 
however, the system introduced externalities that made the “price” approach at best imperfect. Thus, the 
RVA concluded, to achieve accident reductions, the BGS would have to fix Q, that is, introduce rules that 
required firms to adhere to certain practices.  As Weitzman stresses, in general there is no particular 
reason to prefer the P approach over the Q approach. Here P did not work perfectly because of the way 
the system was designed. 
Throughout we focus on the specific problem of controlling industrial accidents in the German 
Reich. But the themes raised here relate to two other literatures. First, Bismarck’s social insurance system 
was arguably the first in the world. Admirers have long stressed its successful combination of services 
and cost control. Bismarck’s insurance scheme formed the institutional model for the current systems in 
Germany and several other Continental countries, and long functioned as the desideratum for U.S. and 
other reformers. As I. Rubinow wrote in 1913, “There is no doubt that the modern conception of social 
insurance – as a system carrying with it compulsion, state subsidies, and strict state supervision and 




large degree, all these three elements, maybe described as the German system.”2 Here we stress features 
of the system that did not work as well, as acknowledged even by sympathetic contemporaries. Second, 
the broader question of how to motivate individual behavior in a mutual system lies at the heart of a great 
deal of research in insurance, finance, and related fields. Our story suggests that the BGS never fully 
overcame the free-riding problem that plagues many mutual schemes. 
This paper is part of a larger study of the development of social insurance in Germany. A series 
 
of earlier papers (Guinnane and Streb (2011), Jopp (2010-2012)) focused on the Knappschaften, the older 
 
miner’s insurance system whose practices were influential in the formation of Bismarck’s social 
insurance scheme. The current paper draws on both the published statistics of the BGS and the RVA, and 




1.   From Liability Legislation to Accident Insurance 
 
The 1884 accident-insurance legislation reflects dissatisfaction with earlier approaches. In the 1860s 
industrial accidents became the subject of extensive discussion. The political historiography rightly 
stresses industrial accidents and the later accident-insurance system as part of a broader struggle that first 
saw attempts to suppress the worker’s movement, and later efforts to co-opt at least parts of it. Labor 
groups argued that industrial accidents reflected the abuse of workers by the capitalist system; firms could 
save money by not making safety improvements, instead letting workers bear the human and financial 
consequences of injury and death. Military and other leaders worried that industrial accidents were killing 
and maiming the potential soldiers necessary to protect Germany. And a wide range of observers 
complained that the cost of industrial accidents fell on taxpayers through the local poor law. Firms 






2 Rubinow (1913 [1969], p.13). The point of the longer passage is to deny Bismarck’s central role in the creation of 
modern social insurance; Rubinow asserts what is now the received view that the “new” German social insurance 
system rested on earlier institutions, and that experimentation in other countries had also produced useful results. 




industrial firms were shifting the consequences of a poor safety record to local taxpayers, many of whom 
benefited little, if at all, from the presence of industrial firms. 
The well-documented rising tide of industrial accidents formed the backdrop to these discussions. A 
series of accidents in the late 1860s seemed intended to illustrate these problems. In 1867, a shaft in the 
Saxon Lugnau coal mine collapsed, claiming 101 victims. Methane gas explosions at the Ruhr mine 
"Neu-Iserlohn" killed a total of 99 miners in 1869. Later that year, gas explosions in the Saxon mines 
Segen Gottes ("God’s  Blessing") and Neue Hoffnung ("New Hope") killed a further 340 miners 
(Kleeberg (2003, p. 86 ff)). The local Knappschaften (a mutual-insurance system operating for miners 
only) paid for medical expenses and disability pensions, but the latter were perceived as inadequate 
(Boyer 1995, p.21). Outside the mining industry there was no comparable system of social 
protection. Public opinion was particularly offended that the surviving relatives of the victims were not 
entitled to compensation from the employer. They could only hope for support from poor relief.3 
In response to these problems the government introduced the Imperial Liability Act of 7 June 1871, 
which in theory made firms financially responsible for the consequences of accidents. The way it 
assigned responsibility however, made the law at best a partial success. Strict liability applied only to 
railways (Kleeberg (2003), Held (1888)). For other sectors the law placed a burden of proof on the injured 
worker. Operators of mines, quarries, or factories were obliged to compensate accident victims or their 
survivors only if the worker or his representative could prove that the owners had caused the accident by 
their own acts or omissions. Labor groups opposed the 1871 Act, arguing that because of their limited 
education and financial reserves, working people were not in a position to pursue legal action against their 
employers, even if likely to win eventually. As the provincial Government in Düsseldorf put it in 1877 
The factory inspector’s report notes that the effects of the Liability Act do not correspond to 
expectations. At best, only the accident insurance companies have benefited. The insurer and 
especially the worker are seldom able to provide the proof of liability that §2 of the Act requires. The 
fact that the injured has the burden of proof means that the law is illusory in most cases. The injured 




3 On Knappschaften see Guinnane and Streb (2011) as well as Guinnane, Jopp, and Streb (2012). For a discussion 




reason court cases are exceedingly rare, in most cases there is a meager monetary agreement, and 
often the injured walks away completely empty-handed.4 
 
Many employers purchased liability insurance to meet potential costs under the Act. Contemporaries 
claimed these insurance policies exacerbated the problem because insurance companies had a greater 
interest in and expertise at avoiding or delaying payments (see, for example, Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung 1882).5 The liability legislation left employers equally unhappy. Many complained that judges 
were too willing to rule in favor of an injured worker, and often assigned unreasonable damages (Lehr 
(1888, pp.27-39)). According to Baare, the Director General of the Bochum Association of Mining and 
Cast Steel, this situation led many accident victims to gamble on a big win in court: "If the worker wins, 
he becomes a pensioner; if he loses, he becomes a beggar." 6 
The situation prevailing in Germany under the 1871 liability echoes problems that arose in 
 
Anglo-Saxon countries under common-law doctrines of liability. Part of the issue in England and the 
United States turned on the ways common-law rules were interpreted; in some jurisdictions, judges 
absolved employers of responsibility if they found that either the worker himself or some other agent 
(potentially another worker) bore some fault. Historians have also stressed the practical difficulties facing 
workers who tried to sue their employers under common-law rules. An injured worker (or his survivor) 
was usually not in a position to finance litigation and wait for a court decision that might take years. And 
potential witnesses might be reluctant to testify in a workers’ favor, since there were most likely 







4 Bericht der Regierung Düsseldorf an den preußischen Handelsminister Dr. Heinrich Achenbach, 2. August 1877, 
in: Born et al (1993), 54. All translations from German are our own. 
5 Little is known about the liability insurance industry that covered firms in the period 1871-1884. Apparently many 
of the first employers in the new BGS were former employees of insurance companies who had been let go when the 
1884 law reduced demand for their product. The RVA attributed the success in starting the 1884 system quickly to 
the experience and availability of these employees (Geschäftsbericht des RVA für die Zeit bis zum 31. Dezember 
1885, BArch R89/491). 
6 Promemoria des Kommerzienrats Louis Baare für den preußischen Handelsminister Karl Hofmann, 30. April 1880, 
in: Born et al (1993), 163. 
7 The best reference on ”workman’s compensation“ in the United States is Fishback and Kantor (2000). Witt (2004) 




The 1884 Act 
 
Like the rest of Bismarck’s social-insurance system, the 1884 accident-insurance law described a class 
of workers who were required to participate in the scheme. The accident insurance law (§1) at first 
included all employees with an annual income of up to 2000 Marks who worked in mines, saltworks, 
processing plants, quarries, shipyards, factories and steel mills. Later legislation expanded the compulsory 
insurance to other occupations/groups such as agricultural workers and construction workers.8 In 1885, 
the first year for which comprehensive data are available, the system insured almost three million 
 
workers. By 1914, through the extension of the system to new industries and the growth of industries 
already covered, that figure had grown to 9.2 million workers. 
Both workers and factory owners welcomed the shift to insurance with the 1884 Act. Labor groups 
preferred the insurance approach partly because it removed the question of “fault” from the compensation 
discussion. Thus the 1884 system was a form of strict liability where the pay-outs were capped. The 
owners also preferred accident insurance to the older liability scheme. Insurance made accident costs 
limited and calculable both by assigning specific tariffs to particular types of outcomes, and by pooling 
costs across a large number of firms and thus making insurance costs stable (Wickenhagen (1980), 
Bödiker (1895)). 
The 1884 law forbad private-law claims against employers, so the insurance premia were the only 
costs to employers (Clemens (1889)). These restrictions seem indeed to have reduced expenses per 
accident. According to Lehr’s calculations,  expenses per accident for one of the BGS in 1886 were about 
182 Marks. In 1882, the damages covered by the private accident insurer Leipziger Unfallbank amounted 
 




8 See Gesetz über die Ausdehnung der Unfall- und Krankenversicherung (May 28 1885); Gesetz, betreffend die 
Fürsorge für Beamte und Personen des Soldatenstands in Folge von Betriebsunfällen (March 1886); Gesetz 
betreffend die Unfall- und Krankenversicherung der in land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Betrieben beschäftigten 
Personen (May 5 1886); Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallversicherung der bei Bauten beschäftigten Personen (July 11 
1887); and Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallversicherung der Seeleute und anderer bei der Seeschifffahrt beteiligten 
Personen (July 13 1887). 
9 Fishback and Kantor (2000) and Fishback (1987) note that the average compensation to accident victims in the 




workers still bore some of the costs; for the first thirteen weeks after an accident, medical costs were 
shouldered by the worker’s health-insurance fund, and workers paid half the costs of their health 
insurance (§5).10 The 1884 law (§5) required that an injured worker receive all necessary medical care 
free of charge. The law also specified a menu of mandatory additional benefits based on the worker’s 
income at the time of the accident. A permanently disabled worker, for example, received 66.6 percent of 
his last earnings as a pension;  a worker’s widow  was entitled to twenty percent of her husband’s last 
labor earnings (until she remarried); and each surviving child of worker killed in an accident received 
fifteen percent of the worker’s earnings until the age of 15.11   Thus while instituting a form of strict 
liability, the 1884 Act capped damages. 
The institutional heart of the accident insurance system was the BGS.12 §9 of the 1884 Act designated 
 
the BGSs as the carrier of accident insurance. Each BGS consisted of a group of firms in related industries. 
The law allowed companies to create either a single, nation-wide organization, or to form regional 
groupings within a single industry.  Both types of BGS emerged. All German musical-instrument makers 
belonged to a single BGS, for example. The iron and steel industry, on the other hand, established eight 
regional BGS. The BGS paid all costs for therapies, accident benefits and administrative costs, and funded 
these expenses by levying contributions on member firms (§10). This paper focuses on the operation of 
the accident-insurance system, and thus defers the political economy of its creation to a later 




previously received little or no compensation. The reduction in average compensation in Germany after the 1884 
Act suggests that insured German firms had had to compensate most accident victims before. Unfortunately we have 
no information on this earlier period and thus cannot compare compensation levels before and after the 1884 Act. 
10 A BGS could provide for the injured through special rehabilitation programs during this waiting period to restore 
their ability to work and to avoid permanent accident benefits. “It was emphasized that in cases of serious injury, the 
restoration of the working ability of the injured was usually quicker and more sustainable in cases where an 
immediate, even if expensive, treatment program followed the injury rather than relying on health insurance 
treatment… In this way not only the interests of the injured were served, but the substantial expenses of the BGS 
were decreased by a lessening of permanent benefit payments.” Umfrage betreffend die Übernahme des 
Heilverfahrens während der Karenzzeit durch die Berufsgenossenschaften gemäß §76c des 
Krankenversicherungsgesetzes, March 1895, BArch R 89/630. 
11 All widow and orphan benefits together could not exceed sixty percent of the worker’s last wages. 
12 Although called „cooperatives“ (Genossenschaften), these entities bore no legal or other relationship to the older 





Clearly the system came into being because it received the support of most actors with a stake in the 
legislation.13 But that does not mean that all actors favored the system as it came into being. Mares (2003) 
argues that some high-risk producers (such as iron and steel) had wanted a national system that would 
allow them to shift some of their costs to safer sectors (such as textiles). The BGS system made such cost- 
shifting across sectors impossible. But the system clearly tolerated cost-shifting within BGS, perhaps 
from large to small firms. Under §14 of the 1884 Act, larger firms received more votes for the governing 
bodies of the BGS. Voting rules were not linear, but a firm with 20 covered worked had one vote, a firm 
with 1000 workers had 18 votes, and a firm with 10,000 covered workers had 108 votes. Thus it was 
possible for a small number of large firms to outvote smaller firms within the BGS, and this power would 
enable them to adopt procedures that would penalize small firms relative to their actual risks. We cannot 
test this claim with the information currently available, however, so it remains a possible explanation for 
findings reported below.14 
Table 1 provides a statistical overview of the 68 BGS that existed in 1914. The RVA organized them 
 
into 26 different sectors. The size of the average BGS differed considerably across sectors, from the huge 
organizations in construction, mining and iron and steel down to the small groups for insurance and 
musical instruments. More importantly, the reported accident rates in 1914 differed dramatically. A 
railroad worker was 6.6 times as likely to suffer a fatal accident, and 5.3 times as likely to meet with any 





2.   Allocating costs 
 
 
13 Fishback and Kantor argue the same for the United States; workmen’s compensation systems pleased both labor 
and employer interests, and thus were enacted at the same time as other elements of a social-insurance system went 
down to defeat. This was clearly not the case in Germany, but, given the limited democratic accountability of the 
Reich government, it is unclear whether Bismarck’s success in creating a general social-insurance system can be 
taken as evidence that German interests supported health insurance and other measures. 
14 To this point we have been unable to use any archival information for the BGS in the period prior to World War I. 
The archive consulted for this project is for the RVA. Presumably the BGS’s internal records would enable us to 





Perhaps the BGS’s most important task (§28) was to allocate the costs of accidents across member 
firms. To do this, the BGS constructed a risk estimate that supposedly reflected each firm’s contribution 
to expected costs. (We will refer to the entire scheme as the “tariff,” and the individual risk figure 
assigned to each firm as its “risk level.”) Each BGS was required to construct a tariff intended to last for 
3-5 years; at the end of one tariff period, the BGS proposed a new tariff. While the BGS was responsible 
for proposing a tariff, the RVA had to approve each tariff before it could go into effect, and the RVA 
could make suggestions to prod the BGS in a different direction. 
The BGS recognized that some firms had many different plants with operations that differed in their 
risk to works. They thus assigned each establishment (Betrieb) to a “risk class” (Gefahrenklasse) that 
reflected in principle the expected costs of accidents in an establishment of that type. A risk class for a 
given BGS might consist of heterogeneous plants such as rolling-mills and smelters; the idea was to 
group plants together if their accident risks were similar, not to group establishments by technology or 
product. A large, multi-establishment firm might have plants spread out across many risk classes. The 
BGS then reckoned each member firm’s contribution units  (CUi) as a weighted sum of the total wages 
and salaries (Wi) paid to workers in each risk class and the “risk level” or “risk figure”  (Gi) associated 
with each class. A firm’s size affected its contribution through Wi.15 
 
This system incorporated an element of experience rating, but not in the way that term is usually 
understood. Experience rating in a modern insurance system means that a given firm’s premium reflects 
both its inherent risk, due to its activity (for example, manufacturing engines), and an adjustment upwards 
or downwards that reflects that firm’s own accident history. The adjustment gives firms a financial 
incentive to improve their safety record, and helps the insurance company cope with otherwise 
unobservable differences among its clients. Experience rating in the BGS system was cruder. First, the 
relevant experience was for all establishments of a given type within a BGS, not for a particular firm. 
Thus a firm with a plant in risk class A would see its insurance costs go up or down with accidents in risk 
 
 
15 A detailed description of the contribution calculation can be found in the Rheinisch-Westfälische Maschinenbau- 
und Kleineisen-Berufsgenossenschaft: Statistische Tabellen zur Ermittlung der Gefahrenziffern für den vom 1. 




class A, even if those accidents occurred in plants belonging to other firms in the BGS. This subtlety was 
poorly understood in the early years of the insurance system; BGS boards had to re-explain the system, 
over and over, to firms that had experienced few accidents but that nonetheless were assigned to high risk 
classes. For example, the board of the Rhein-Westphalian engineering and small iron industry felt it 
necessary to give the following explanation in 1893, some eight years after the system was created: 
It has also been mentioned here that the risk figures are calculated for the entire group of similar firms 
and that within this, every single member has to pay the contribution corresponding to its wage bill, 
regardless of whether accidents have occurred in a particular firm, because the possibility of an 
accident exists in all firms.16 
 
Each BGS used its own accident statistics to construct these tariffs. In the method originally used, the 
average risk level of like firms in a sector was reported as a weighted sum of the number of accidents per 
1,000 workers. For fatal accidents the weight was assumed to be 10; for accidents that caused permanent 
total incapacity, 30; for accidents that caused permanent partial incapacity, 15; and accidents that caused 
temporary incapacity were assigned a weight of unity (Hartmann (1900, p.9)). The weights were 
supposed to reflect the costs to the BGSs of different types of accidents. Widow’s benefits were, for 
example, much less costly than the disability pension required for a permanently incapacitated worker.17 
In May 1896 the RVA informed the BGSs that henceforth they must use a new way of calculating the 
 
figures. To capture the financial burden to the BGSs more accurately, the crude weights noted above were 
replaced by the expenditure of firms in each risk risk level on medical treatments and accident benefits for 
each type of accident, divided by the aggregate wages and salaries of the companies concerned. The RVA 





16 Rheinisch-Westfälische Maschinenbau- und Kleineisen-Berufsgenossenschaft: Statistische Tabellen zur 
Ermittlung der Gefahrenziffern für den vom 1. Januar 1893 ab neu einzuführenden Gefahrentarif, BArch R 
89/15626. 
17 We can illustrate the original system using data provided by Hartmann (1900, p.11). Between October 1885 and 
December 1893, the textile BGS’s wool-spinning mills experienced 72 fatal accidents, 12 accidents that resulted in 
permanent total incapacity, 652 accidents that resulted in permanent partial disability, and 109 accidents that 
resulted in temporary disability. The weighted average was thus (72 * 10) + (12 * 30) + (652 * 15) + (109 * 1) = 
10,969. Since there were 209,257 full time employees in the period under consideration, the weighted accident rate 
per 1,000 workers was 52. The risk levels in each industry branch of a BGS were calculated in this way and then 
normalized to a predetermined range and collectively formed the operative risk level tariff for a period lasting up to 





recorded under the most recent agreement.18 The company-specific contribution units (CUi) of the 
member firms (1...n), which were calculated as a product of total wages and salaries (Wi) and the risk 
level (Gi), became the basis for allocating the BGSs’ financial burden. In the second step of the 
assessment system the individual contribution for a firm i (Ci) was determined as the product of its 
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Suppose the sum of the individual contribution units (CUi) was 1000. A member firm with 100 units 
therefore had a relative share  (ci) of 10% of all the contribution units. If the BGS’s expenses (E) came to 
a total of 50,000 marks, this firm would pay 5000 marks (Ci) to the BGS, irrespective of the costs that the 
firm itself had caused. For most of the period under study here, the average BGS collected from firms a 
sum representing about 1.6 percent of the wage bill.19 But there is a great deal of dispersion around  that 
mean; the top twenty five percent of BGS collected about 2 percent, while the bottom twenty five percent 
collected about .1 percent. Variations in costs across industries line up very closely with the variations in 




3.   A model of incentives with the BGS cost allocation 
 
Before considering the historical episode in detail, we first outline a simple model to evaluate the 
incentive effects implicit in the Reich Liability Act of 1871 and the later BGS’ tariff system. Assume that 
firm (i) produces output (y) with the two inputs, labor (l) and capital (c). The firm’s technology can be 
described by the following production function: 
 
 
18 Schreiben an die Vorstände der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften vom 18. Mai 1896, BArch 89/630. 
19 Hartmann (1900, p.5) reports that in 1898 the Hannover’s demolition/construction BGS carried the heaviest load 
in this year, paying premium amounting to about 10 percent of its wage bill. This figure is much higher than what 




y f (l,c)  (2) 
 
Assuming a competitive environment with given output price (p), wage (w) and interest rate (r), profit 
maximization leads to the well-known maximum-profit condition 
y 
l  w 
y  r 
c (3) 
 
The firm’s production plan (y0, l0, c0) is optimal if and only if the ratio of the marginal products of labor 
and capital is equal to their price ratio. We use this production plan in the following as a benchmark. 
Suppose now that a strict liability law is introduced which requires the firm to bear the (expected) 
economic costs of accidents per worker (gi). We can interpret these costs as the firm’s individual risk 
level determined by its particular production technology. The firm can reduce the (expected) economic 
costs of accidents per worker to (gi-ei) by implementing additional safety practices or by introducing less 
risky production methods. However, the accident-reducing effort (ei) also involves convex costs v(ei) with 
 
v’(ei)>0 and v’’(ei)>0. The firm’s profit function is now 
 
p y(l,c) (w  (gi ei )) l r c  v(ei ) l  (4) 
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Combining (5) and (6) we obtain the new maximum-profit condition: 
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From (7) we know: 
 
v'(ei ) 1  (9) 
 
From both the decreasing marginal productivity of labor and the fact that gi ≥ ei, we see that the firm 
facing strict liability uses more capital (cL>c0) and less labor (lL<l0) to produce the same output. Liability 
has the same effect as a tax on labor and leads to an acceleration of mechanization. In addition, the firm 
now implements safety practices in the amount of eL . 
Now assume the liability law is replaced by an accident insurance system financed by a pay-as- 
you-go mechanism. The individual firm’s contribution are not determined by its individual risk level (gi) 
but by the average risk level (ag) of all member firms (1...n) (or a subset of firms with similar individual 












Hence, the firm’s individual profits are now 
 
p y(l,c) (w  ag) l r c  v(ei ) l  (11) 
 




















1 l v'(e ) l 0 e n (14) 
 
From (14) we have 
 




Comparing equations (9) and (15), we see that the insurance system leads the firm to care less about the 




reduction in e depends on the number of firms (n) used to calculate the average risk level. The impact on 
 






gi  ei v ei ag  v ei ), will increase their labor demand with the transition from strict liability 
 
to the accident insurance scheme. The opposite is true for firms with a comparatively low individual risk 
level. Thus the introduction of the accident insurance has the perverse effect of channeling workers into 
those firms where they face an above-average risk of an accident. 
Suppose instead that the BG assigns a fixed, individual risk level (fg) to every member firm. We 
assume this risk level cannot, at least in the short run, be influenced at all by a firm’s own efforts to 
increase workers’ safety. Then, the firm’s profit is: 
 
p y(l,c)  (w fg) l r c  v(ei ) l  (16) 
 


























From (19) follows 
 
ei 0  (20) 
 
In the case of fixed risk levels, firms have no incentive to reduce the (expected) economic costs of 
accidents per worker.  Summing up, our analysis implies eL>eAG>eFG=e0=0. Both in a system without 
compensation of workers’ accidents costs and under an accident insurance system with fixed risk levels, 
firms will not be motivated to increase worker safety. The consequences are worse, however, in the 




Pre-1871, Germany had no reliable system for forcing firms to pay for the economic consequences of 
industrial accidents. The 1871 Liability Act changed that (e0→eL), and then the 1884 Accident Insurance 
Act created the system under discussion in this paper. The fixed risk levels and lack of firm-level 
experience-rating in the original post-1884 scheme reduced firms’ incentives to reduce accidents in their 
operations (eL→eFG). Under pressure from the RVA, at the end of the nineteenth century the BGS began 
to use more and more risk classes, in effect assigning firms to pay rates that more nearly reflected the 
costs they incurred for the BGS. The differentiation of tariffs into many different average risk levels 




4.   Accident insurance and its discontents 
 
Our model implies three different incentive effects from the way the BGS allocated costs. All 
were known to contemporaries. First, the system encouraged the substitution of capital for labor. A firm 
could not change its assignment to a given risk class, and any firm’s conduct had only the smallest (and 
delayed) effect on the contributions due from a firm in that class. But a firm could reduce its insurance 
costs immediately by reducing the wage bill. Thus a system intended to protect workers from the costs of 
industrial accidents might leave them unemployed. 
Second, the system did not necessarily reward investments in equipment or research that would 
reduce the risk of accidents, even if somehow all the firms in a given risk class collaborated to make these 
investments simultaneously. This effect has two components. Any reduction in costs would affect the 
firm’s situation only after the adoption of a new risk tariff, which might be three or four years in the 
future. Moreover, because the RVA insisted on basing current risk calculations on the entire history of the 
BGS, the effect of changes today was muted by practice in the past. This approach annoyed some BGS, 
who noted, correctly, that it meant they could be paying today for practices they no longer used.  For 
example, the serious but not fatal accident rate for the iron and steel BGS prior to 1909 was 5.8 accidents 




however, was required to use information on accidents produced by the production conditions that had 
created the much higher, earlier rate. As the smelting and rolling mill BGS complained in 1915:20 
the basis for the risk level is no longer applicable. [...] It does not take into account the fact that 
the new modes of operation, the introduction of electricity and of various new machines as well 
as the success of accident prevention would have resulted in a very different burden allocation 
than the one of the past decade and a half. New and better equipment would undoubtedly have 
reduced the operating risks. Therefore we might consider whether the old century should not be 
taken into account at all so as to better capture the new situation."21 
 
As the engineering and small iron industry BGS remarked in the same context, "every risk level […] is 
made not for the past, but for the future.”22 This BGS resisted the RVA more than others.  In 1896 it 
proposed a revised tariff that was based on only three years’ worth of accident data, in open defiance of 
the RVA’s regulations. When questioned, the BGS replied that its new safety rules had made earlier data 
a poor predictor of future accidents. In 1913 the BGS proposed a revised tariff that used data back to 1890 
(but not to the system’s beginning), but also included alternative calculations showing how misleading the 
RVA’s approach was.23 
The RVS’s insistence on using all available historical data is hard to understand. The RVA 
 
explained it by an appeal to the law of large numbers: only by using all available information could the 
BGS calculate the right risk levels.24 This argument reflects faulty statistical reasoning. If the underlying 
parameters of the process generating accidents changes, then there is little to learn from using old data. 





20 Formerly the Rheinisch-Westfälische Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft. 
21 Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft, Aufstellung eines neuen Gefahrentarifs vom 1. Januar 1915, 
Rundbrief des Vorstands vom 16. August 1915, BArch R 89/15623. (“..dass die Grundlagen für den Gefahrentarif 
nicht mehr zutreffend seien. [...] Er berücksichtige [...] nicht, dass die neuen Betriebsweisen, die Einführung der 
Elektrizität und vieler neuer Maschinen sowie die Erfolge der Unfallverhütung das Belastungsverhältnis gegenüber 
den ersten anderthalb Jahrzehnten der gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung ganz anders gestaltet hätten. Neue und 
bessere Maschinen hätten die Betriebsgefahren zweifellos verringert. Deshalb wäre zu erwägen, ob das alte 
Jahrhundert nicht ganz auszuschalten sei, um die neuen Verhältnisse besser zu erfassen.“) 
22 Letter from the Maschinenbau- und Kleineisenindustrie-Berufsgenossenschaft to the Reich Insurance Office vom 
11. Januar 1904, BArch 89/15627. 
23 The material is in BArch R89/15626 and R89/15628. The alternative calculations are unfortunately not with the 
letters to the RVA. 
24 Rundschreiben an die Vorstände der dem Reichsversicherungsamt unterstellten gewerblichen 
Berufsgenossenschaften betreffend Festsetzung der Gefahrenziffern und Abänderung der 




important thing was for firms to share risks within a BGS. But the way firms share risk within a mutual 
organization like a BGS shapes the incentives to expend funds on the prevention of accidents. 
Third, the most important incentive effect of the assessment system was the externality noted 
above: it was almost never cost-effective for any individual member firm to invest in accident-reducing 
measures. (Conversely, an increase in the number of accidents also caused no significant increase in 
individual contributions.) Equation (1) shows that the increase in a BGS’s expenses (ΔE) that resulted 
from an increase in accidents of a single firm led to a relatively small increase ciΔE in the contribution of 
the actual causer, where ci, is smaller, the more companies belong to a BGS. 25 Most of the rise in accident 
 
costs [that is, (1-ci)ΔE] was passed on as externality to other firms in the BGS. 
 
Contemporaries questioned the RVA’s approach, noting the perverse incentives. Germans had 
experience with more differentiated systems. Private-sector liability insurance issued in response to the 
1871 Liability Act typically used a more complicated tariff structure, incorporating firm-level histories in 
setting insurance premia. As Poeverlein (1900, p.17) put it, "Under private insurance, determination of 
the contributions reflected the greatest possible individualization of risk, following technical insurance 
principles; with accident insurance, on the other hand, it more or less took place according to generalized 
assessment standards."  At some level the practices adopted by the BGS reflect a step back. 
The BGS were aware that firms with above average accident expenses increased all member firm 
contributions. The requirement to join a BGS made adverse selection at the system level impossible under 
the 1884 accident insurance legislation. But individual BGS sometimes tried to affect their own costs by 
attracting or repelling particular firms.  An economy as developed as Germany’s in the 1880s was bound 
to have firms that would not fit easily into a reasonable number of industrial categories, and some conflict 
reflected which BGS had to take the firms that did not naturally fit anywhere. BGS sometimes tried to 
prevent a particularly high-risk firm from joining.  In 1889, for example, the south German precious and 
 
 
25 Note that a firm’s relative contribution also depends on its (relative) size. One could imagine a firm that owned all 
plants in a given danger class; in this case there would be no externality. Because of the role of historical data in the 
construction of risk estimates, however, such a firm would continue to pay premia that did not reflect the full 
reduction in risk associated with the safety improvement. In any case, we are unaware of any firm that employed all 




base metal BGS tried to exclude Lorenz, a firm that made metal cartridges and machines. Lorenz’s works 
included the hazardous activity of filling cartridges with gunpowder. The south German precious and base 
metal BGS’s board thought this activity a more natural fit to the chemical industry’s  BGS.26 That fact 
that a BGS would want to rid itself of a member firm suggests once again that the premium system was 
 
imperfect; in principle, a BGS should not care about its membership, so long as it could price all risks 
correctly. 
Even if a BGS could not exclude a comparatively risky firm, the BGS could abuse the firm in 
ways that made its situation unattractive. A small firm that played only a marginal role in its BGS was  at 
risk of being assigned unjustified, high risk levels. One example of this problem comes from the 
southwest German iron BGS. Among the “misfits” belonging to this BGS were firms that operated steam 
rollers. In 1889 this BGS’s risk levels ranged from 5 to 50, and it assigned the steam rollers to the class 
with a risk level of 35. In 1906 the BGS revised its tariff so that the overall levels ranged from 5 to 70, 
and assigned the steam rollers a level of 50.27 At the 1909 BGS meeting, the steam road roller operators 
objected to the proposed new figure of 23, calling instead for a classification with the much lower risk 
figure of 8.5. The other member firms overwhelmingly rejected this proposal.28 The steam roller operators 
 
then appealed to the RVA. The regulator’s intervention eventually succeeded in persuading the southwest 
German iron BGS to lower the rollers’ risk figure to 16. This number more nearly reflected the estimate 
one would draw from the steam rollers’ own accident statistics, 15.04.29 In this case the BGS had tried to 
ignore its own statistical information and assign the steam roller firms a risk figure fifty percent higher 
than was warranted. This example also shows the RVA’s power: when it cared to, the regulator could 






26 Jahresbericht der Handwerkskammer für den Amtsbezirk Pforzheim, 1989, BArch 89/1095. 
27 Gefahrentarife der Südwestdeutschen Eisen-Berufsgenossenschaft 1899 und 1904, BArch R 89/15619, R 
89/15620. 
28 Extract from the Protokoll der ordentlichen Genossenschaftsversammlung der Südwestdeutschen Eisen- 
Berufsgenossenschaft vom 30. September 1909, BArch R 89/15620. 
29 Brief von der Südwestdeutschen Eisen-Berufsgenossenschaft an das Reichs-Versicherungsamt vom 14. 




All of these problems were made worse by the BGS practice of creating tariff structures 
consisting of a few risk classes with similar risk values. In the 1880s, the mean number of risk classes for 
all BGS was 6.6, and the mean absolute span (ratio of the highest to the lowest risk level) was 9.8. This 
practice made little sense, given the range of firms grouped within a single BGS. For example, in the late 
1880s, the Rhein Westphalian smelting and rolling mill BGS assigned 87 percent of its member firms 
(weighted by the number of workers) to the risk levels 35, 50 or 65.30 This limited range probably reflects 
the fact that in the 1880s the BGSs did not yet have the long-term accident statistics required to assign 
individual establishments to specific risk levels: 
At the founding of a Berufsgenossenschaft for accident insurance the main concern of the 
individual firms was that they would be cheated during the assessment of the risk categories 
because each manufacturer believed his firm to be the least dangerous. This general fear is also 
the reason for the effort by many industrialists to group only firms of the same type in a BGS.31 
 
But lack of information was not the only problem. BGS boards found it difficult to assign realistic risks to 
sectors that were financially dominant within the group. Until 1918, for example, the Rhein-Westphalian 
engineering and small iron industry BGS clumped together three different types of machine-building 
firms. When the BGS finally split them up, they were in three different classes with very different risk 
levels, showing that the earlier assignments had been way too crude.32 In another example, the Rhein- 
Westphalian smelting and rolling mill BGS assigned two groups of firms, non-iron smelters and gun- 
drillers, to the same risk level of 35 in 1897. But the BGS’s own data showed how different the two 
groups were. The non-iron smelters had a statistical risk figure of 25, and the gun drillers a figure of 
56.33 The gun drillers cost the BGS more than twice as much as the smelters, but, for a given firm size, 






30 Unfallverzeichnis der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft vom 1.Oktober 
1885 bis 31. Dezember 1891, BArch R 89/15622. See also table 2. 
31 Vorschlag zur Ermittlung der Gefahrenklassen für keramische Gewerbebetriebe, Max Rösler, 15. Februar 1885, 
BArch R 89/15900. 
32 Rheinisch-westfälische Maschinenbau- und Kleineisen-Berufsgenossenschaft: Erläuterungsbericht zum 
Unfallverzeichnis für den Gefahrentarif 1918 bis 1922, BArch R 89/15628. 
33 Unfallverzeichnis der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft für die Periode 




§28 of the accident insurance law did allow a BGS to impose on an individual firm a higher or 
lower tariff than would be implied by the general tariff scheme. With the help of these surcharges or 
discounts the BGS could move in the direction of firm-level experience rating, and thus condition the 
relative contribution units (ci) on firm-level experience. Some BGSs formally adopted such provisions in 
their tariffs, but the practice was rare. Reluctance to use this approach reflected the perception that it 
would cause trouble with the affected firms, but not produce much in the way of change. For example, the 
board of the BGS for precision mechanics and electrical engineering claimed in 1909 that „an increase or 
discount of the standard risk levels [...] has not been executed in any case, since we lack sufficient reason 
for it.“34 Other BGS explicitly opposed the introduction or retention of such regulations. The board of the 
northwest iron and steel BGS explained in 1914: 
The board does not want the power to decrease the risk level in a case of lower risk, because there 
would be a host of applications for discounts, and if granted these discounts would only create 
dissatisfaction. The board also does not attach great value to the possibility of increased risk 




This was not the only BGS board that lacked the will and the resilience to use premia to reward good 
behavior and punish dangerous practices. 
Faced with this passivity, the RVA increasingly pressed for more differentiated tariffs. One well 
documented case illustrates this lengthy negotiation process in detail. Until 1900, the Rhein-Westphalian 
smelting and rolling mill BGS’s tariff had only six risk classes. That figure was increased to seven in 
1900. Only in 1910 did the BGS shift to a structure with 33 risk classes, despite its growing database of 
accidents and the ability to construct a more differentiated tariff based on its own history. The RVA had 
long objected to the BGS’s approach: for the tariff starting in 1900, the RVA wanted 26 (!) different 
classes. The BGS professed to understand the advantages of a greater number of groups, but still refused 
 
 
34 Brief des Genossenschaftsvorstands der Berufsgenossenschaft der Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik an das 
Reichversicherungsamt vom 6. März 1909, BArch 89/15613. 
35 Letter from the Genossenschaft board of the Nordwestlichen Eisen- und Stahl-Berufsgenossenschaft to the Reich 
Insurance Office from March 24 1914, BArch R 89/15642. A similar argument had been made in 1899 by the board 
of the Rhein-Westphalian engineering and small iron industry BGS. Compare Brief des Vorstands der Rheinisch- 
Westfälischen Maschinenbau- und Kleineisenindustrie-Berufsgenossenschaft an das Reichs-Versicherungsamt vom 




to implement this suggestion. The explanation was self-contradictory: “While being completely aware of 
the fact that a greater number of risk levels would cause a more correct use of the figures based on the 
accident register for every firm, we still believed that the resulting small deviations from the accident 
register would not be in the interest of the overall structure of the tariff.”36 The RVA was willing to 
compromise and instead suggested that the number of the groups be increased from 6 to 13. The BGS 
nevertheless rejected also this suggestion: 
The purely mechanical procedure based on the statistics that has been favored by the Reich 
insurance office excludes every opinion, grounded in practical experience, of the members of the 
association; and the current action of the office [the RVA] can be characterized as interference in 
the right of self-determination of the association [BGS], which cannot be legally justified. The 
Reich insurance office has no cause to complain when the association sets a risk rate through its 
own institutions, of which it cannot be claimed that there was a procedure in violation of  correct 
principles.37 
 
Figure 1 shows that the RVA’s ongoing insistence eventually achieved success. BGS in some of the 
more dangerous industries were enthusiastic converts to the cause of more danger classes; between 1909 
and 1915, the groups rose significantly in all iron and steel BGS, reaching 69 classes in the southern 
German iron and steel BGS. Even the Rhein Westphalian smelting and rolling mill BGS finally came 
around and, in 1910, increased the number of groups from 7 to 33. In their defense of the proposed rates 
they adopted the RVA’s arguments: 
With this [traditional] way of allocation to the risk groups, the difficulties and benefits of the 
contribution increase could not be avoided. An enterprise, such as the coal gas stations, that had 
the liability figure 17.7 (1885/1903) joined the group A and had to adopt a figure of 25 in the 
contribution calculations. Another enterprise, for example the iron foundries with the liability 
figure 41, were assigned to group B and paid only 35. At the encouragement of the Reich 
insurance office and in agreement with it, the current revision should change this procedure, and 
the liability figures of the individual industry branches implied by the accident record should 
immediately substitute as the basis for the  risk figure. It is clear that in this way, a more correct 







36 Letter of the board of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft to the Reich 
Insurance Office, August 14 1899, BArch R 89/15622. 
37 Protokoll der 16. Genossenschaftsversammlung der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Hütten- und Walzwerks- 
Berufsgenossenschaft, August 26 1899, Bericht des Vorsitzenden, BArch 89/15622. 
38 Protokoll der Genossenschaftsversammlung der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Hütten- und Walzwerks- 




The RVA’s successful pressure to create more groups had two effects. First, by creating more groups a 
BGS ensured more homogeneity within a group. Second, by reducing the number of firms assigned to a 
group, the BGS gave each firm a greater impact on its own future contributions.  Both effects linked a 
firm’s financial contribution more tightly to its own record. The RVA hoped this new incentive structure 




The insurance rates offered the BGS an imperfect instrument for encouraging firms to reduce 
accidents, and most were reluctant to use its full power. The BGS had another tool at its disposal: it could 
directly impose better practices on member firms. This approach had two parts. The BGS could issue 
rules (Unfallverhütungsvorschriften) designed to force firms to adopt safety devices or production 
methods that reduced certain well-known risks. One important set of rules, for example, required covers 
on power-transmission belts and similar moving parts. The second aspect of the rules approach was 
inspectors who had the power to verify that the rules were being followed, and to recommend fines 
against firms that did not adhere to the rules.40 
Industrial practice at the time offered opportunities for small changes that would make the 
 
workplace safer. This was a constant theme in the RVA’s newsletters. In a letter of June 1890, for 
example, the RVA claimed 
It can be recognized from the accident statistics that almost a quarter of all serious accidents that 
are caused by machinery occur in connection with transmission belts and gears. In 269 cases, 
workers got caught in the belt and were injured. In 731 cases, workers ended up in the wheels 
gear, most of which lacked a cover. These figures suggest that it is in the interests of effective 
accident prevention to install belt boxes, wheels tops and belt and wheel railings, and 
 
 
39 The hope for a similar incentive effect was expressed in September 1869 at the meeting of the Kongress deutscher 
Volkswirte. Speaker Karl Braun stated: “The best regulator is always 
the own interest of the mining companies. It occurs in a similar manner in other areas, for example with the railway 
administration. […] In short, we want to make the law so forceful that it prevents accidents.” Verhandlungen des 
Kongresses deutscher Volkswirte über die Reformbedürftigkeit des Haftungsrechts, September 1869, printed in: 
Born et al (1993), 33 f. 
40 In 1913, the average BGS levied almost six thousand Marks in fines, and one-quarter of all BGS received more 
than 8300 Marks in fines. Six thousand Marks was equivalent to 51 Marks per million Marks paid in wages in that 
year, so for the average firm the fines were a small expense.  The sources available to us do not report the 




simultaneously to adopt a rule whereby the production belts may be replaced only at slow speed 
or when the machine has been switched off. 41 
 
Firms often resisted the introduction of these rules. Given the externalities implicit in the system of risk 
calculation, it is no surprise that individual firms ignored recommendations on safety practice. One can 
view the inspectors and fines as an effort to align the firm’s interest with those of the BGS.  Figure 2 
shows that over time, the BGS spent more and more money on writing and trying to enforce the safety 
rules. (The sharp jump at the outset apparently reflects the large costs of writing the first set of initial 
rules). From 1900 to 1914, these expenditures nearly doubled as a fraction of all insurance contributions. 
Inspectors’ salaries comprise the majority of such costs. The BGS were getting more serious about 
requiring their members to use the safety techniques the body demanded. The slight decline in income 
from fines over our period may reflect that vigilance; firms were more sure of getting caught, and so were 




5.   The outcomes: accidents 
 
So what was the net effect of the imperfect incentives implied by the risk tariffs, and the BGS’s ability 
to write and enforce safety rules? The RVA’s data include a careful reckoning of accidents, dividing them 
into several categories that reflect the accident’s financial consequences. We re-work the RVA categories 
slightly to compute the risk of an accident (per thousand worker-years) of any type; of fatal accidents; of 
accidents that were serious but not lethal; and of other accidents, which we will call “minor.”42 The 
classifications reflect the consequences for the worker, and correspond imperfectly to the financial 
implications for the firm. The death of a worker with no survivors could cost less than long-term support 
for a permanently disabled worker. Figure 3 reports the accident experience of all BGS in our 




41 Rundschreiben an die Vorstände sämtlicher ausschließlich vom Reichs-Versicherungsamt ressortierenden 
Berufsgenossenschaften, betreffend die Unfälle, die infolge von Blutvergiftung den Tod der Verletzten 
herbeigeführt haben, sowie die Unfälle an Treibriemen und Zahnrädern vom 17. Juni 1890, BArch 89/628. 
42 These are the categories used in modern ILO reports. Serious, non-lethal in our usage is the RVA’s category of 




steadily, and only declined after 1907. But this view masks important changes in the incidence of 
 
different types of accidents. Lethal accidents declined slowly, but they did decline (regressing lethal death 
rates on a linear time trend yields a slope coefficient of -.0036 with a t-statistic of -4.57). Serious, non- 
fatal accidents declined by about one-half from the mid-1890s to 1914. The overall accident rate looks 
worse than it would otherwise because of the steady increase in minor accidents. 
We are interested in how these changing accident rates reflect BGS-level decisions about insurance 
rates, rules, and other matters. But there are two very different issues that must be addressed first. First, 
the increase in minor accident rates combined with decreasing serious accident rates raises questions 
about reporting and, more interestingly, the possibility that improved safety practices sometimes reduced 
the severity of an accident’s outcome, rather than reducing the incidence of accidents. The reporting issue 
is one that affects many studies of accident-insurance systems. If employers have an incentive to call a 
serious accident minor, then we must be careful about the margin between those two outcomes. (The 
reverse might also be a problem.) In our view, the fatal and serious accident categories are fairly 
trustworthy.  Accidents leading to deaths are very hard to conceal. And both practice and incentives 
suggest more serious, non-fatal accidents were reported. All accidents had to be reported to the local 
police, and workers always had the right to challenge the determination of the accident’s severity.  Any 
effort to shift a serious accident to the minor category could trigger a worker grievance, a grievance that 
would have to be reported to the RVA and that would ultimately be settled by an arbitration panel. 
On the other hand, the margin between a minor accident and no reported accident at all could reflect a 
host of consideration that make the “minor accident” category unreliable (at least over time and across 
firms). Consider a case where a heavy object hits a worker, resulting in a bruise. One could imagine the 
incident being considered an accident, with reports, compensation etc. On the other hand, the affected 
worker might just shrug it off, or be given some informal compensation (such as the rest of the day off) 




headings, but we are more than a little skeptical of the reports on minor accidents.43 Because the “all 
accidents” category includes minor accidents, we must be skeptical of it, too. 
We also consider the possibility that improvements in safety practices could shift the actual impact of 
an accident from the “fatal” to the “serious” category or from the “serious” to the “minor” category. The 
effect in either example is that a new practice that made accidents more survivable, or that made formerly 
serious accidents minor, would look like an increase in the less-grave type of accident, when in fact it 
reflects an improvement in safety. This situation would arise if a change in equipment or practice made 
some accidents more survivable, or if an accident that would formerly incapacitate a worker become one 
from which he could recover and return to work quickly. These  possibilities imply that the increase in 
minor accidents documented above could be a sign of the system’s success rather than its failure. To 
address this possibility, we estimated (but do not report) a series of models in which  the dependent 
variable is one accident rate (for example, fatal accidents) and the regressors include lags of another 
accident rate plus year and BGS fixed effects. This approach does not suggest that fatal accidents were 
shifted to some other category. But the relationship between serious and minor accidents is very strong; a 
10 percent decrease in serious accidents implies a 4.5 percent increase in minor accidents.44 This result 
 
suggests care in examining any given type of accident rate as an outcome measure.45 
 
One could also worry that a purely compositional effect might lurk behind the data presented in 
 




43 Fishback (1987) raises a different issue, which is whether worker-years are the proper control for exposure to the 
risk of an accident. If working time is pro-cyclical then workers will face more exposure to accident risk during 
economic booms. Our regression estimates below use year fixed-effects in part to control for this issue. But we 
agree that it would be better to have industry-level measurs of working hours, which are not available. 
44 The statement in the text refers to the elasticity at the means. The estimate is -.560 with a t-statistic of -13.67. The 
precise estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of lagged terms, but the basic result is robust. 
45 Both the RVA and the BGS were proud of their medical care and rehabilitation measures. Over the long run of the 
system’s creation, one can imagine that improvements in care made it possible for some injured workers to return to 
work more quickly (or at all). But this effect would not show up in the regressions discussed in the text because of 
the year fixed effects. Another possibility is moral hazard, a claim that is a staple of contemporary observations of 
German factories and workplaces elsewhere. The claim is that firms would pay to install a certain type of safety 
improvement, but workers would either disable the equipment (because doing so made their jobs easier) or not 
follow safety instructions. We know no serious way to evaluate the moral-hazard claims. But it is unclear why they 
really matter; surely firm accident-prevention efforts should be thought of as encompassing both equipment and 




BGS level, or a change in the relative sizes of BGS. Figure 4 illustrates the issue by focusing on two large 
sets of BGS, eight in steel and eight in textiles. The steel industry was considerably more dangerous than 
textiles. Employment in the steel industry also grew more rapidly than in textiles in the decade prior to 
World War I. The overall accident statistics would look better if the steel industry had grown more slowly 
and the textile industry more rapidly. But is this phenomenon general enough to play an important role in 
the national accident statistics? We can address this question using a simple counter-factual exercise. We 
fix the relative sizes of the BGS at the levels for 1886, but use the historical accident rates for each BGS. 
We then compute a counter-factual overall accident rate such as reported in Figure 3. The counter-factual 
varies only slightly from the historical aggregate accident rate, suggesting that the evolution of national 




6. Regulating for safety 
 
The BGS’ diverse experiences suggest a close look at the determinants of accidents within each BGS. 
We are interested primarily in the mechanisms the BGS could use to reduce accidents: the number of risk 
classes, the span of the risk levels assigned by the current tariff, and the amount the BGS spent to enforce 
its rules. The first two variables are the key features of each tariff. The last, enforcement, we view as a 
proxy for the effort to use safety rules to reduce accidents. Our basic tool is a series of econometric 
models in which the dependent variable is a measure of the accident rate. We start with models where 
observations are BGS-years. We always include year fixed-effects to control for shocks common to all 
BGS (such as unobserved innovations in RVA policy or new technologies). The year fixed-effects should 
also help to standardize the accident rates by controlling for unobserved changes in working time, so long 
as those changes are similar across BGS. All specifications include the controls insured (the number of 
insured workers per BGS, a measure of size) as well as mean wages (the average wage per insured 
worker, a measure of the expected cost of an accident). 
The sum spent each year on factory safety inspectors (“enforcement”) is available from the RVA 
 




archival reports. One is the number of classes in the BGS tariff (“classes”) and the other is the range of 
risk levels (“span”).46 To reduce costs we did not collect classes and span for all BGS. The last column of 
Table 1 reports the availability of these measures in our data. The overall sample has 1943 BGS-years of 
observation; when using these two archival variables, we have 1477 BGS-years of observation. The mean 
BGS for which we have these variables has about 103 thousand covered workers and an accident rate of 
6.75 per thousand worker-years. BGS lacking these variables have an average of 105 thousand workers 
and an accident rate of about 6. Because our results on those measures rely on a sub-set of BGS, one 
could worry our results would be different for the entire universe of BGS. We cannot of course know 
what the effects in question would be for the other BGS, but the available information does not suggest 
systematic differences between the BGS for which we have these measures and for which we do not. 
Two econometric issues require care. The three policy variables are certainly endogenous. The 
endogeneity could reflect simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity, or both. In all specifications we use 
BGS-level fixed effects (FE) to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. While this is a standard approach in 
panel models, the heterogeneity across BGS might not be additive or fixed over time. For example, 
changing accident rates might reflect technologies that change differently across sectors over time (even 
among BGS in the same sector), or changes in the boards running the individual BGS. We also face the 
problem that because classes and span are fixed for a tariff period, these policy variables have no within- 
BGS variation for a given tariff period. In this case we shift to observations that are a BGS-tariff-period 
rather than a BGS-year. 
Table 3 reports within-BGS fixed-effect (FE) estimates for all four types  of accident rates. The 
models include but do not report year fixed effects. The two controls insured and mean wages have 
similar effects across accident types, and their effect is broadly invariant to the inclusion of the policy 
variables (the exception is minor accidents). Larger BGS had lower accident rates. This effect is very 
consistent. BGS whose workers are more highly-paid have higher accident rates. This result is consistent 
with the idea that labor markets price out risk in the form of higher wages in riskier settings, but we lack 
 




the wage data needed to test for compensating differentials precisely. We expect all three policy variables 
to have a negative relationship with accidents. The estimates reported in Table 3 confirm this expectation; 
the estimates for all three policy variables are either negative or statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
In columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) of Table 3, we enter all three policy variables at once, providing the 
implicit “horse race” that compares the effects of the several policy variables. In the other specifications 
we use either classes and span together, or enforcement alone. These estimates in Table 3 serve as 
comparisons for our IV results below. As a practical matter we cannot estimate models with three 
endogenous variables.47 
The estimates in Table 3 might be inconsistent if the endogeneity in the policy variables reflects 
 
simultaneity. To deal with this issue we experimented with a number of possible instruments from the 
limited group of candidates available to us.  We settled on two lagged exogenous variables. Each exploits 
the fact that when a BGS devised a new tariff, it had to use only information available at that time. Thus 
classes and range are fixed for the period of tariff t, but reflect information available at tariff period t-1. 
Last_mean_stock is the average number of past accidents for which the BGS was paying claims, and 
last_mean_ins is the average number of insured workers in that tariff period. Because of the fixed effects 
in the model, both instruments should pick up only aspects of the BGS’s experience that might lead it to 
change policy direction in the new tariff period. The exclusion restriction is satisfied mechanically 
because the instruments are lagged and we have fixed effects. 
Exploiting these instruments requires that we shift the unit of observation to coincide with the period 
for which a tariff was in force. Thus the estimates reported in Table 4 use as their observations the tariff- 




47 We experimented with combining classes and span into a single metric, for example, the average span per class. 
The results were broadly similar to what we report. The problem with this approach is that classes and span really 
capture two different aspects of the tariff. By adding more classes, the BGS was assigning risks more precisely. By 
increasing the span, it was making the more dangerous enterprises pay a higher premium A BGS could, and did, 
change one variable without affecting the other. 
48 Fixed-effect estimates analogous to those reported in Table 3, but based on the tariff-period observations, yields 
results similar to those reported in Table 3. This and the next paragraphs refer to models estimated but not reported 




GMM estimates of our instrumental-variables model.49 None of the policy instruments affect all 
 
accidents; this might reflect reports of minor accidents, which we view as unreliable. For fatal and serious 
accidents, the number of risk classes and the amount of enforcement each have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. For the two most consequential types of accidents (and the ones for which we 
most trust our data), the measures the RVA was pushing the BGS to take actually had an effect, even if 
the BGS resisted taking them.50 
But how much did these policies matter? The elasticities implied by the estimates in Table 4 are 
large, given the slow and uneven pace of accident reduction documented at the outset. A 10-percent 
increase in the number of risk classes would lead to a 7.9 percent reduction in fatal and a 12.2 percent 
reduction in serious accidents. Increased enforcement had a smaller effect; a 10-percent increase in 
expenditure on enforcement reduced fatal accidents by 1.5 percent, and serious accidents by 1.8 percent. 
These elasticities are based on local effects, so we should not extrapolate them too far from the sample 
means. That said, the average number of classes increased nearly four-fold from 1885 to 1914; the 
average span, more than four-fold; and the average expenditure on enforcement even more. Above we 
stressed the design flaws that made it hard to a BGS to assign risk properly, and the reluctance of many 
BGS to use even the tools at their disposal. Our estimates imply that even these tools, however, were 
quite powerful, and that if the BGS had adopted them earlier and more universally, the hoped-for decline 





49 Table 4 combines all BGS and all years. We experimented with focus on a single industry (such as steel or 
textiles, for which they were multiple BGS). While constrained by the number of observations and our instruments, 
these results did not suggest radical differences in impacts across industry classes. We also split the sample at 
various points in the 1890s, when the RVA increased its pressure to use more classes and spans, and to increase 
enforcement efforts. Again, this exercise is limited by sample-size and instrument considerations, but suggested no 
structural break in the way the policy variables work. 
50 The instruments work well for the enforcement of rules, but for classes and span are probably “weak” in the sense 
of the recent literature on weak instruments. Consider the specification reported in column (3) of Table 4. The 
Angrist-Pischke test of excluded instruments is 7.77 (p=.0058). The Cragg-Donald Wald F is 5.09. The Stock-Yogo 
critical values in this case imply a maximal IV size of between 15 and 10 percent. Similar results obtain in other 
specifications using classes and span as endogenous regressors. For equation (4) of Table 4 (and specifications like 
it) the instruments have more power. The Angrist-Pischke test statistic is 16.36 (p=0) and the Cragg-Donald statistic 
is 52.79. The Stock-Yogo critical value for a maximal IV size of 10 percent is 19.93. Note that the results for classes 






Germany’s 1884 accident-insurance legislation is rightly famous as a central part of a larger 
system that eventually provided virtually the entire German population with economic security in the face 
of accidents, illness, or old age. The accident-insurance system in particular protected workers against the 
financial consequences of workplace mishaps. But the system enjoyed only disappointing success in 
reducing accidents, the number of which was an important motivation in the system’s creation. This 
experience reflects in part legislation that made it difficult for the BGS to price firm-level risk 
appropriately, and the BGS’s reluctance to use even the weak tools at its disposal. Nonetheless, our 
estimates imply that the tools available to the BGS had powerful effects, and, if used earlier and more 
generally, might have led to the desired outcomes earlier in the system’s history. 
The failure to reduce accident rates more rapidly than occurred may reflect another feature of the 
accident-insurance system, and a basic difference in the objectives of the BGS and their regulator. The 
accident-insurance legislation forced firms to pay (via the BGS) for the economic consequences of 
accidents, but ruled-out punitive damages. And the fines imposed for safety violations were for violation 
of a rule, but not to deter outrageous behavior. At some level, the 1884 law made industrial accidents too 
cheap for German industry, or at least too cheap to induce firms to improve safety to a level where 
accidents would be as rare as the RVA wanted. And this was the real reason for the RVA’s stress on 






The “BGS database” was constructed from the annual reports of the RVA, which in turn are 
based on the annual reports each BGS was required to file with the RVA. We cite these reports below as 
Reichs-Versicherungsamt (ed.),  Amtliche Nachrichten des Reichs-Versicherungsamts. We augmented 
this information with several measures drawn from the archival files in the collection R 89 of the 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin. These are (1) Number of risk classes (1) the number of distinct classes in the 
periodic revisions of the insurance tariff.   (2) Span of risk levels: this is the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest risk level in each tariff.  Since most BGS set the lowest risk at unity, span is usually equivalent to 
the largest absolute difference. Information on the number of risk classes and spans of risk levels are 
taken from various files in which the RVA collected printed tariffs, letters, and other documents that dealt 
with the development of each BGS' particular tariff system. These files can be located with the help of 
Findbücher zu Beständen des Bundesarchivs Bd. 32: Reichsversicherungsamt Bestand R 89, Teil 2: 
Unfallversicherung, bearbeitet von Hans-Dieter Kreikamp, Koblenz 1987, Abschnitt 5.4: Gefahrentarife 
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Table 1: Overview of the 
BGS as of 1914 
  
Sizes of BGS 






 BGS Establishments Workers Workers/Estab All Fatal  information 
Construction 13 19541 1040862 5.3 18.1 1.5 387 yes 
Apparel 1 12635 165379 13.1 3.4 0.1 30 yes 
Mining 2 13343 1240588 93.0 10.2 1.4 60 yes 
Inland water trans 4 20540 178217 8.7 12.2 2.7 114 yes 
Printing 1 8700  51660 5.9 8.5 0.2 30 no 
Chemical industry 1 15014 245980 16.4 7.2 0.7 30 yes 
Iron and steel 8 48488 1315280 27.1 9.9 0.7 240 yes 
Railways 2 746 211857 284.0 19.7 1.6 60 no 
Energy industry 1 3756  72021 19.2 5.4 0.5 30 no 
Precision engineering 1 8339 306773 36.8 5.8 0.5 30 yes 
Drinks and tobacco 3 24788 157483 6.4 7.9 0.7 90 yes 
Glass industry 1 1110  83069 74.8 3.5 0.2 30 yes 
Trade 1 50667  40471 0.8 11.4 0.5 2 no 
Wood processing 4 72462 393534 5.4 10.6 0.4 120 yes 
Leather industry 1 8197  94087 11.5 4.9 0.3 30 yes 
Metal production 2 6986 193915 27.8 7.1 0.1 60 yes 
Musical instruments 1 1515  55196 36.4 3.4 0.1 30 no 
Foodstuff 4 131717 654466 5.0 6.0 0.4 107 yes 
Paper industry 2 5800 204699 35.3 6.4 0.3 60 yes 
Smithing 1 57585 320586 5.6 2.5 0.1 13 no 
Chimney Sweeper 1 4321 332185 76.9 0.1 0.0 30 no 
Textiles 8 18717 911453 48.7 2.5 0.1 240 yes 
Trans and storage 2 92591 431905 4.7 17.7 1.6 58 yes 
Pottery 1 1456  77547 53.3 3.3 0.2 30 yes 
Insurance 1 20819  47859 2.3 1.9 0.3 2 no 
Brick manufacture 1 10228 181231 17.7 6.5 0.7 30 yes 
 
Sources and notes for Table 1: Source: BGS database. Notes: Accident rates measures as accidents per thousand worker-years of exposure. N. Obs is the number 




Table 2: Risk figures for the Rheinisch-Westfälische Hütten- und Walzwerks- Berufsgenossenschaft, October 1886 
 




































Iron bridge installations 
 
 




Table 3:Fixed effects estimates with annual observations 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 


























  variable)   
 
Insured -0.00427 -0.00907 -0.00745  -0.00229  -0.00354  -0.00264  -0.00363 -0.00858 -0.0110 0.00165  0.00305 0.00620 
(0.0157)  (0.0164)   (0.00927) (0.00106) (0.00144) (0.00109) (0.00927)  (0.00975)  (0.00611) (0.0142) (0.0141)   (0.00465) 
Mean wage  0.00520 0.00759 0.00796 0.00159 0.00221 0.00183 0.00473 0.00719 0.00811 -0.00112 -0.00181 -0.00199 
(0.00755)  (0.00789)  (0.00471)  (0.000532)  (0.000733)  (0.000528)  (0.00459)  (0.00486)  (0.00295)  (0.00709)  (0.00703)   (0.00251) 
Classes  -0.0188  -0.0241  3.70e-05  -0.00136  -0.0101  -0.0156 -0.00872 -0.00716 
(0.0194) (0.0189) (0.00150) (0.00214) (0.0150) (0.0139)  (0.0188)  (0.0184) 
Span  -0.00734 -0.00835  -0.00137  -0.00164  0.00341 0.00237 -0.00937 -0.00908 
(0.00959)  (0.0101) (0.000989) (0.00110) (0.00534)  (0.00540)  (0.0102)   (0.00999) 
Enforcement  -0.0141   -0.0144  -0.00366  -0.00437   -0.0145  -0.00763 0.00410  -0.00238 
(0.00840) (0.00397) (0.00118) (0.00103) (0.00763) (0.00318)  (0.00940) (0.00416) 
Constant  2.550   2.719  1.810  0.620  0.664  0.503  1.310  1.484   1.103  0.620  0.571   0.204 
(0.657) (0.644) (0.468) (0.0812) (0.0926) (0.0564) (0.406) (0.396) (0.283) (0.482) (0.454) (0.266) 
 
Obs 1,411 1,411 1,943 1,411 1,411 1,943 1,411 1,411 1,943 1,411 1,411 1,943 
R-squared 0.551 0.547 0.602 0.112 0.083 0.195 0.367 0.353 0.442 0.537 0.537 0.556 





























































































































  Number of BGS  48  51  48  51  48  51  48  51   
 
 
Note: Estimated by GMM. See text for definition of instruments and discussion of exclusion restriction and instrument strength. The 
observations in this table are the means of the relevant variables for a given tariff period for each BGS. The model includes unreported 






























1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 
 
1qtr med 3qtr 
 
 
Source: BGS database 
 































Source: BGS database 
 
Note: “Fines” are total income from fines, per thousand Marks of contributions paid by member firms. “Rules” are total expend iture on safety inspectors, and 
































































1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 
 
All accidents Serious, non-lethal accidents Minor accidents Lethal accidents 
 
 
Source: BGS database 
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Appendix: First-stage regressions for IV models 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Number of classes  Span  Enforcement   
 
last_mean_stock 0.000764 -0.00135 0.00203 
 (0.000333) (0.000697) (0.000788) 
last_mean_fine -8.12e-05 0.00132 0.000808 
 (0.000160) (0.000575) (0.000388) 
ins_per 0.0224 -0.176 0.177 
 (0.104) (0.0697) (0.111) 
wages_per 0.000118 0.100 -0.0864 
 (0.0501) (0.0350) (0.0549) 
year1887 -6.488 -2.534 8.358 
 (15.87) (4.277) (6.234) 
year1888 8.192 6.348 10.28 
 (8.005) (4.921) (6.387) 
year1889 -8.907 -3.110 10.51 
 (8.621) (3.783) (4.921) 
year1890 7.932 3.290 4.958 
 (7.909) (3.833) (3.322) 
year1891 -0.190 -0.360 10.21 
 (8.165) (2.099) (2.816) 
year1892 -4.483 2.097 10.19 
 (8.585) (4.678) (3.016) 
year1893 6.449 -2.652 3.371 
 (8.602) (4.149) (3.619) 
year1894 6.790 10.14 9.153 
 (8.598) (9.641) (6.380) 
year1895 -4.069 13.27 5.385 
 (9.079) (10.64) (5.682) 
year1896 5.787 5.010 10.65 
 (8.971) (7.203) (5.423) 
year1897 2.982 8.761 7.341 
 (8.111) (5.632) (5.156) 
year1898 3.297 15.23 -2.217 
 (8.140) (7.424) (4.679) 
year1899 19.76 20.22 31.58 
 (11.72) (22.32) (17.95) 




 (13.23) (21.24) (17.51) 
year1901 -4.057 19.38 6.301 
 (9.912) (13.77) (10.06) 
year1902 8.433 -3.295 10.08 
 (14.96) (15.86) (7.803) 
year1903 5.544 27.40 8.471 
 (8.172) (6.001) (2.999) 












year1906 17.52 48.01 14.94 
 (13.10) (20.39) (18.05) 
year1907 -7.599 -11.92 10.37 
 (14.01) (22.63) (12.09) 
year1908 12.07 22.52 13.80 
 (8.478) (11.44) (6.399) 
year1909 15.65 40.57 24.89 
 (12.05) (17.23) (12.56) 
year1910 10.73 54.08 -1.492 
 (13.94) (16.13) (21.92) 
year1911 16.69 5.730 23.11 
 (17.87) (20.03) (19.75) 
year1912 -0.715 19.03 13.29 
 (10.11) (21.40) (5.961) 
year1913 13.62 32.18 27.22 
 (8.883) (9.504) (8.783) 
year1914 9.304 23.32 13.20 
 (7.979) (7.511) (6.833) 
Constant 6.393 10.84 -6.520 









R-squared 0.643 0.534 0.699 
  Number of BGS  52  50  68   
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first two variables are excluded instruments in the IV models. The observations here are tariff-period means; we 
can use individual year fixed-effects because the BGS used different tariff periods. 
